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Nietzsche	and	Self-Constitution	Ariela	Tubert		[Draft,	to	appear	in	Katsafanas	ed.,	Routledge	Philosophy	Minds:	The	Nietzschean	Mind]		 	According	to	the	self-constitution	view,	a	person	is	a	kind	of	creation:	we	constitute	our	selves	throughout	our	lives.		The	self-constitution	view	can	be	contrasted	with	views	of	the	self	that	are	based	on	psychological	or	physical	continuity	(e.g.	continuity	of	memories,	the	body,	or	the	brain)	or	non-naturalistic	views	that	focus	on	the	underlying	substance	or	soul.		In	opposition	to	these	other	views,	on	the	self-constitution	view,	we	play	an	active	role	in	self-creation.		The	self-constitution	view	may	take	more	than	one	form:	for	example,	on	the	narrative	version,	the	self	is	like	a	story,	while	on	the	Kantian	version,	the	self	is	a	set	of	principles	or	commitments.		I	will	argue	that	there	are	good	reasons	for	interpreting	Nietzsche’s	view	along	the	lines	of	a	self-constitution	view.		Such	interpretation,	I	will	argue,	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	many	of	Nietzsche’s	remarks	about	the	self	that	otherwise	may	seem	contradictory.		In	what	follows,	I	start	in	Section	I	by	outlining	the	self-constitution	view.		In	Section	II,	I	argue	that	despite	seeming	evidence	to	the	contrary,	the	self-constitution	view	fits	quite	well	with	Nietzsche’s	view.		And	finally,	in	Sections	III	and	IV,	I	consider	and	respond	to	some	possible	objections.		I.	Self-Constitution			 Self-constitution	views	share	the	idea	that	the	self	is	constructed	throughout	a	person’s	life.	The	two	self-constitution	views	that	I	will	focus	on	here,	Schechtman’s	and	
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Korsgaard’s,	share	a	starting	point	in	the	practical	as	opposed	to	theoretical	domain.1			They	each	argue	that	a	notion	of	a	self	that	endures	over	time	is	required	to	make	sense	of	practical	reason	as	we	know	it.	Thus,	though	we	may	have	reasons	to	do	away	with	the	notion	of	unified	self	in	theoretical	reason,	the	practical	domain	presents	its	own	demands	for	such	a	self.	2			Korsgaard	and	Schechtman	independently	contrast	their	own	accounts	of	the	constitution	of	the	self	with	Derek	Parfit’s	view	of	personal	identity.		Parfit’s	view	represents	for	Korsgaard	and	Schechtman	the	conclusions	of	a	purely	theoretical	perspective.	Their	disagreement	with	Parfit	starts	from	their	rejection	of	the	theoretical	as	the	only	point	of	view	for	thinking	about	the	self.		Parfit	presents	a	broadly	empiricist	argument	for	a	reductionist	psychological	continuity	theory.		On	Parfit’s	account,	personal	identity	over	time	is	given	by	psychological	continuity.3		Furthermore,	Parfit	argues	that	there	is	nothing	too	special	about	personal	identity	or	the	self.4		What	matters	are	the	
																																																								1	See	for	example,	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves	and	Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency:	A	Kantian	Response	to	Parfit”	and	Self-Constitution:	
Agency,	Identity,	and	Integrity.	2	As	we’ll	see	below,	Schechtman’s	and	Korsgaard’s	arguments	are	different	from	each	other	but	share	the	notion	that	only	the	self-constitution	view	can	make	self	of	various	aspects	of	practical	reasoning.		3	Though	the	details	don’t	matter	for	my	argument	here,	more	specifically,	for	Parfit	personal	identity	is	psychological	continuity	when	it	takes	a	non-branching	form.		The	version	of	psychological	continuity	he	prefers	is	referred	to	as	relation	R	and	the	non-branching	requirement	is	a	requirement	that	the	relation	be	one-to-one	or	uniqueness.		With	that	in	mind	for	Parfit,	personal	identity	is	R	together	with	uniqueness.	See	for	example,	Reasons	and	Persons,	262-263.			4	See	for	example,	“Because	we	ascribe	thoughts	to	thinkers,	it	is	true	that	thinkers	exist.		But	thinkers	are	not	separately	existing	entities…		We	could	…	redescribe	any	person’s	life	in	impersonal	terms.		In	explaining	the	unity	of	this	life,	we	need	not	claim	that	it	is	the	life	of	a	particular	person.		We	could	describe	what,	at	different	times,	was	thought	and	felt	and	observed	and	done,	and	how	these	various	events	interrelated.		Persons	would	be	mentioned	here	only	in	the	descriptions	of	the	content	of	many	thoughts,	desires,	
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various	relations	that	hold	among	psychological	events	and	in	particular	psychological	continuity	is	what	really	matters	to	us.5			The	emphasis	on	practical	reason	plays	a	large	role	in	Korsgaard’s	and	Schechtman’s	responses	to	Parfit	and	in	their	arguments	for	the	self-constitution	account.		In	the	rest	of	this	section,	I	outline	each	of	their	responses	to	Parfit	and	then	outline	the	general	characteristics	of	a	self-constitution	account	that	will	be	used	in	the	remaining	of	the	paper	to	argue	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	providing	a	self-constitution	account	of	the	self.		 Korsgaard	follows	Kant	in	distinguishing	between	the	theoretical	and	practical	standpoints.		The	theoretical	standpoint	is	the	one	we	take	when	we	“regard	ourselves	as	objects	of	theoretical	understanding,	natural	phenomena	whose	behavior	may	be	causally	explained	and	predicted	like	any	other.”6		The	practical	standpoint,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	one	we	take	on	when	we	“regard	ourselves	as	agents,	as	the	thinkers	of	our	thoughts,	and	the	originators	of	our	actions.”7			Korsgaard	believes	that	these	two	standpoints	cannot	be	“fully	assimilated,”	they	are	different	perspectives	or	points	of	view	we	may	take	when	thinking	about	our	own	choices.		She	believes	that	“[w]hen	we	look	at	our	actions	from	the	theoretical	standpoint	our	concern	is	with	their	explanation		and	prediction.		When	we	view	them	from	the	practical	standpoint	our	concern	is	with	their	
																																																																																																																																																																																memories,	and	so	on.		Persons	need	not	be	claimed	to	be	thinkers	of	any	of	these	thoughts.”	(Parft,	Reasons	and	Persons,	251.)	5	Part	of	Parfit’s	reasoning	is	that	personal	identity	requires	uniqueness	and	that	what	matters	is	not	uniqueness	but	psychological	continuity.		See	for	example,	Parfit,	Reasons	
and	Persons,	261-265.			6	Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency”,	119.	7	Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency”,	120.	
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justification	and	choice.”8		The	two	standpoints	operate	differently,	with	each	providing	different	goals	and	governed	by	different	rules.	Korsgaard	argues	that	the	distinction	between	theoretical	and	practical	reason	allows	Kant	to	accept	a	lot	of	Hume’s	empiricist	and	ultimately	skeptical	conclusions	about	the	self	while	finding	a	notion	of	a	unified	self	in	practical	reason.9		Similarly,	Korsgaard	is	able	to	grant	a	lot	of	Parfit’s	reductionist	conclusions	by	attributing	them	to	theoretical	reason	while	arguing	that	practical	reason	requires	and	is	able	to	provide	for	a	notion	of	a	unified	self.10	Korsgaard	argues	that	an	empiricist	view,	focused	on	sense	impressions	and	desires,	will	fail	to	find	a	unified	self.		Nonetheless,	she	believes	that	a	certain	unity	of	the	self	can	be	found	in	practical	reason:	While	we	may	exhibit	various	psychological	dispositions	and	inclinations,	we	can	perform	only	one	action	at	a	given	moment.11		This	is	partly	the	result	of	having	only	one	body;	whatever	disunity	we	may	have	within	us,	Korsgaard	argues,	we	must	come	together	to	act.12		Self-constitution	for	her	is	the	process	of	deliberating	and	deciding	what	to	do	by	adopting	or	committing	to	principles	that	in	
																																																								8	Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency”,	120.	9	See,	for	example,	Sources	of	Normativity,	229.		10	See,	for	example:	“Supposed	Parfit	has	established	that	there	is	no	deep	sense	in	which	I	am	identical	to	the	subject	of	experiences	who	will	occupy	my	body	in	the	future….		I	will	argue	that	I	nevertheless	have	reasons	for	regarding	myself	as	the	same	rational	agent	as	the	one	who	will	occupy	my	body	in	the	future.		These	reasons	are	not	metaphysical,	but	practical.”		(Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency”,	p.	369)	11	See,	for	example:	“You	are	a	unified	person	at	any	given	time	because	you	must	act,	and	you	have	only	one	body	with	which	to	act.”	(Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency”,	111.)	12	Note	that	for	Korsgaard,	“action”	is	intentional	action.		See	for	example,	Korsgaard,	Self-
Constitution,	97.	
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turn	select	competing	desires	or	inclinations	for	endorsement.	13		Thus	on	her	view	the	self	does	not	exist	prior	to	choices	or	actions	but	is	constituted	by	them.14		Korsgaard	believes	that	there	is	a	difference	between	impulses	motivating	an	action,	which	she	categorizes	as	things	happening	to	a	person,	and	the	person	acting.15		Crucially	for	Korsgaard,	acting	involves	enough	psychic	unity	so	that	the	action	can	be	attributed	to	an	agent	even	“in	the	face	of	psychic	complexity.”16		She	believes	that	“it	is	essential	to	the	concept	of	agency	that	it	be	unified,”	because	“to	regard	some	movement	of	my	mind	or	my	body	as	my	action,	I	must	see	it	as	an	expression	of	my	self	as	a	whole	rather	than	as	a	product	of	some	force	that	is	at	work	on	me	or	in	me.”17		Korsgaard	believes	that	the	principles	that	one	endorses	in	making	choices	allow	for	the	distinction	between	motives	acting	in	me	and	me	acting	and	thereby	unify	the	will.			For	Korsgaard,	these	principles	include	the	principles	that	constitute	one’s	various	practical	identities,	for	example,	“the	dos	and	don’ts	of	being	a	teacher	or	a	citizen.”18		In	addition,	there	are	structural	principles	of	practical	reason,	like	the	categorical	and	the	hypothetical	imperatives,	which	are	at	the	center	of	practical	deliberation	and	thus	crucial	for	the	possibility	of	having	a	self.		Korsgaard	believes	that	when	we	make	a	choice	to	act	in	a	certain	way,	we	commit	ourselves	to	a	principle	that	endorses	acting	in	such	a	way.	19			For	example,	when	I	decide	to	grade	some	papers	over	taking	a	nice	stroll	in	the	sun,	I	am	endorsing	the	practical	identity	of	a	teacher	and	a	principle	that	prioritizes	grading																																																									13	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	7.	14	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	19.	15	See	for	example,	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	18.	16	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	7.	17	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	18.	18	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	21.	19	Korsgaard,	Self	Constitution,	77:	“Deciding	is	committing	yourself	to	doing	the	thing.		That	is	another	way	of	saying	acting	is	determining	yourself	to	be	a	cause.”	
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obligations	over	strolling	in	the	sun,	perhaps	under	certain	conditions.		In	endorsing	such	a	principle,	and	taking	it	seriously	in	various	different	circumstances,	I	constitute	myself	as	an	agent,	beyond	impulses	acting	on	me.20		Thus,	for	Korsgaard,	the	self	is	constituted	through	the	operation	of	practical	reason.		Schechtman	does	not	make	the	explicit	distinction	between	theoretical	and	practical	reasoning	that	Korsgaard	does.		However,	Schechtman’s	account	similarly	privileges	the	practical	point	of	view.		Schechtman	criticizes	Parfit’s	view	for	failing	to	“capture	the	real	world	implications	of	personal	identity.”21		She	adds	that	the	notion	of	psychological	continuity	“does	not	seem	to	bear	any	relation	to	the	practical	implications	of	identity	or	to	provide	a	plausible	basis	for	survival,	responsibility,	self-interested	concern,	or	compensation.”22		Schechtman’s	argument	for	the	narrative	view	and	her	critique	of	Parfit’s	view	are	centered	around	four	features	that,	according	to	her,	any	account	of	personal	identity	should	be	able	to	account	for.23		On	her	view,	a	successful	account	of	personal	identity	would	be	able	to	account	for	the	following	four	features:	moral	responsibility,	self-interested	concern,	compensation,	and	survival.24		The	idea	is	that	an	account	of	personal	identity	needs	to	provide	answers	to	questions	about	survival,																																																									20	Notice	that	the	commitment	to	being	a	teacher	need	not	require	me	to	always	grade	over	taking	a	stroll	but	it	will	do	so	in	certain	circumstances.		Furthermore,	breaking	such	a	principle	would	not	always	be	indicative	of	a	lack	of	agency,	only	in	those	cases	where	I	disregard	it	without	any	reason.	21	Schecthman,	1.	22	Schechtman,	25.	23	She	discusses	several	psychological	continuity	views,	centrally	Parfit’s,	Lewis’,	and	Shoemaker’s.		See	Part	I	of	The	Constitution	of	Selves.	24	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves,	14.		One	may	wonder	whether	one	account	of	personal	identity	needs	to	account	for	all	four	features	or	whether	there	may	be	different	accounts	that	fit	each	of	the	features.		Though	she	doesn’t	argue	for	it,	Schechtman	seems	to	assume	that	it	is	one	concept	that	plays	these	various	roles.		It	is	unclear	that	this	assumption	is	unwarranted,	however,	as	the	four	features	seem	to	be	connected	and	overlap	in	various	ways.			
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for	example:	“under	what	circumstances	will	I	continue	to	exist?”		The	notion	of	survival	and	how	we	answer	the	question,	says	Schechtman,	plays	a	central	role	in	practical	reasoning.25			Schechtman’s	view	of	personal	identity,	like	her	account	of	each	of	the	four	practical	features,	is	centered	on	a	narrative	self-conception	that	is	developed	throughout	a	person’s	life	and	that	provides	significance	to	experiences,	memories,	and	choices.		Schechtman	says	that	“[t]he	formation	of	an	identity-constituting	narrative	creates	a	single,	temporally	extended	subject	of	experience,	and	any	two	actions	or	experiences	attributed	to	the	same	person	by	this	view	are	necessarily	attributable	to	the	same	subject	of	experience.”26		So	Schechtman	attempts	to	provide	an	account	of	an	extended	self	over	time	that	allows	for	making	sense	of	central	notions	used	in	practical	reasoning.		The	motivation	and	the	argument	for	her	own	view,	over	the	psychological	continuity	view,	hinges	on	her	view	being	better	able	to	make	sense	of	practical	reasoning	and	our	understanding	of	ourselves	from	the	first	person	perspective.			The	contrast	between	Schechtman’s	view	and	Parfit’s	makes	the	different	approaches	quite	clear:		Parfit	starts	from	purely	theoretical	reasoning	and	gets	to	a	conclusion	that	has	revolutionary	practical	consequences;27	Schechtman	starts	from	practical	concerns	by	accounting	for	the	role	that	an	account	of	personal	identity	plays	in	practical	reason	and	develops	her	account	of	the	self	so	as	to	make	sense	of	it.		Though																																																									25	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves,	14.	26	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves,	149.	27	Parfit	himself	believes	that	these	consequences	are	significant,	though	he	thinks	they	may	be	positive	(see,	for	example,	Reasons	and	Persons,	280-281.)	Schechtman	points	out	that	Parfit,	for	example,	often	uses	practical	considerations	in	motivating	aspects	of	his	view	but	he	ends	up	with	a	view	that	does	not	properly	respond	to	those	considerations.	(See	for	example	her	argument	against	the	extreme	claim,	The	Constitution	of	Selves,	60-66.)	
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Schechtman	and	Korsgaard	have	different	views	of	how	the	self	is	constituted,	they	share	their	opposition	to	Parfit	in	that	he	takes	the	theoretical	domain	to	be	privileged	and	the	starting	point	for	an	account	of	the	self.		For	Schechtman	and	Korsgaard,	the	notion	of	the	self	is	required	in	order	to	make	sense	of	practical	reasoning.				In	addition	to	privileging	the	practical	perspective,	when	it	comes	to	self-constitution,	Korsgaard	and	Schechtman	emphasize	the	first	person	point	of	view.		For	Korsgaard,	this	can	be	easily	seen	in	her	focus	on	deliberation	and	making	choices.	For	Schechtman	it	can	be	seen	in	her	emphasis	on	a	first	person	narrative.		In	addition,	on	their	views,	the	self	is	active	in	self-creation.		The	self	is	not	given	but	constructed	and	one	plays	an	active	role	in	this	construction.		 So,	to	summarize,	taking	Schechtman’s	and	Korsgaard’s	accounts	as	paradigmatic,	I	take	a	self-constitution	account	to	have	the	following	features:		1. Practical	considerations,	rather	than	purely	theoretical	considerations,	are	central.		Indeed,	the	view	allows	that	theoretical	considerations	alone	are	not	enough	to	account	for	the	self.		In	addition,	pure	empiricism	(allowing	only	for	experiences	as	the	basis	for	knowledge)	is	not	enough	to	account	for	the	self.		(Practical)	2. The	account	emphasizes	the	first	person	point	of	view,	the	way	in	which	one	conceives	of	one’s	life,	e.g.	the	narrative	or	practical	identities	one	adopts,	or	the	principles	one	is	committed	to.		(First	Person)	3. The	self	is	constructed	throughout	a	person’s	life	as	opposed	to	just	given.		The	constitution	of	the	self	requires	that	one	be	active,	i.e.	engage	in	narrative	creation	or	in	deliberating	and	making	choices.		This	activity	ends	up	linking	together	what	otherwise	may	be	discrete	and	isolated	psychological	phenomena	either	through	a	
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narrative	or	through	commitment	to	certain	principles.		(Active)		II.	Nietzsche	and	Self-Creation	As	I	turn	to	explaining	why	I	believe	that	a	self-constitution	view	provides	for	a	promising	way	of	understanding	Nietzsche’s	view,	I	want	to	acknowledge	that	at	first	glance,	it	would	seem	that	the	self-constitution	view	is	at	odds	with	many	of	Nietzsche’s	remarks.		First,	Nietzsche	offered	notorious	critiques	of	the	notion	of	a	subject	or	a	self.28		Second,	his	account	of	human	psychology	with	its	emphasis	on	drives	and	unconscious	mental	phenomena	would	seem	to	be	at	odds	with	the	self-constitution	view.		Third,	his	critique	of	the	notion	of	causa	sui	which	he	takes	to	be	“the	best	self-contradiction	that	has	been	conceived	so	far”	would	seem	to	rule	out	an	account	of	self-constitution	where	we	are	active	in	self	creation.29		Despite	these	seeming	problems,	I	find	that	the	self-constitution	account	fits	well	with	a	lot	of	what	Nietzsche	says	and	I	will	argue	in	this	section	that	some	of	these	remarks	mentioned	above	are	not	really	in	contradiction	with	the	self-constitution	account;	rather,	they	fit	well	with	it.		Indeed	self-constitution	theorists	like	Schechtman	and	Korsgaard	have	made	remarks	similar	to	those	made	by	Nietzsche.		Furthermore,	the	self-constitution	account	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	Nietzsche’s	seemingly	contradictory	remarks	and	fits	especially	well	with	his	remarks	about	self-creation,	creating	values,	and	giving	oneself	laws.		And,	finally,	as	I	will	argue	in	Section	III,	the	emphasis	that	the	self-constitution	account	places	on	the	first	person	and	the	practical	point	of	views	fit	quite	well	with	Nietzsche’s	views.																																																												28	See,	for	example,	GM	I:13.	29	BGE	21.	
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Before	developing	my	argument,	I	want	to	briefly	mention	one	more	way	that	the	self-constitution	view	may	seem	at	odds	with	Nietzsche’s	views.		Schechtman	and	Korsgaard	attempt	to	vindicate	morality	in	different	ways.		Schechtman	takes	it	to	be	a	feature	of	her	account	that	it	may	be	able	to	make	sense	of	moral	responsibility.30		Similarly,	Korsgaard	focuses	on	justifying	moral	requirements,	and	ultimately	the	categorical	imperative.		Nietzsche	is	a	critic	of	any	traditional	notion	of	moral	responsibility,	of	moral	requirements,	and	of	the	categorical	imperative.		While	I	suspect	there	may	be	more	agreement	between	Schechtman	and	Nietzsche	in	terms	of	responsibility	than	it	may	appear,	for	example,	my	discussion	of	the	self-constitution	view	is	not	meant	to	endorse	any	direct	connection	to	morality.		Despite	Korsgaard’s	arguments	to	the	contrary,	I	don’t	believe	that	the	connection	to	morality	is	central	to	the	self-constitution	view	as	it	is	clear	from	my	characterization	of	it	at	the	end	of	the	previous	section,	none	of	the	three	features	identified	there	–	(Practical),	(First	Person),	or	(Active)	–	make	any	mention	of	morality	or	moral	responsibility.31			Turning	now	to	the	positive	case	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	along	the	lines	of	the	self-constitution	view,	as	I	mentioned	above,	Nietzsche’s	remarks	about	self-creation	provide	strong	reasons	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	providing	a	self-constitution	account.		In	particular,	the	discussion	in	this	section	is	meant	to	support	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	endorsing	(Active.)		As	defined	as	the	end	of	Section	I	above,	(Active)	stands	for	the	idea																																																									30	Moral	responsibility	is	one	of	the	Four	Features	mentioned	above	that	Schechtman	believes	any	account	of	personal	identity	needs	to	be	able	to	make	sense	of.	31	While	I	will	not	be	able	to	go	into	it	in	this	paper,	I	don’t	believe	that	Korsgaard’s	view,	for	example,	succeeds	in	justifying	the	categorical	imperative.		Nonetheless,	I	find	that	her	account	of	how	the	self	is	constituted	has	appealing	features	besides	the	role	it	may	play	in	the	justification	of	moral	requirements.		For	more	on	this,	see	my	“Korsgaard’s	Constitutive	Arguments	and	the	Principles	of	Practical	Reason.”	
	 11	
that	the	self	is	not	just	given	but	it	is	constructed	throughout	a	person’s	life.		Nietzsche	refers	to	self-creation	in	various	works.		In	The	Gay	Science,	for	example,	he	says	that	“we	want	to	be	the	poets	of	our	life”	and	that	we	“want	to	become	those	we	are—human	beings	who	are	new,	unique,	incomparable,	who	give	themselves	laws,	who	create	themselves.”32		In	the	following	passage	from	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	he	suggest	that	humans	are	creatures	of	their	own	creation:	“In	man	creature	and	creator	are	united:	in	man	there	is	material,	fragment,	excess,	clay,	dirt,	nonsense,	chaos;	but	in	man	there	is	also	creator,	formgiver,	hammer	hardness,	spectator	divinity,	and	seventh	day:	do	you	understand	this	contrast?”	(BGE	225)		Summarizing	the	view	of	many	Nietzsche	scholars,	John	Richardson	points	out	that	“[f]amiliarly,	Nietzsche	thinks	that	a	self	is	something	that	needs	to	be	acquired,	or	rather	created	–	this	is	one	main	reason	for	calling	him	an	existentialist.”33		The	emphasis	on	a	created	self	as	opposed	to	a	given	one	provides	evidence	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	endorsing	(Active).	Whatever	self-creation	is	for	Nietzsche,	it	cannot	be	based	on	the	notion	of	being	
causa	sui,	which	he	famously	criticizes.		Being	causa	sui,	to	be	a	cause	of	oneself,	is	often	ascribed	to	God	as	first	cause	but	sometimes	also	ascribed	to	the	Cartesian	soul.		In	
Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	for	example,	Nietzsche	calls	the	possibility	of	being	causa	sui	“an	absurdity”	and	he	critiques	the	notion	of	causa	sui	as	involving	“the	best	self-contradiction	conceived	so	far.”34		So	when	Nietzsche	speaks	of	self-creation	in	positive	terms,	as	we	saw	above,	he	could	not	mean	something	that	requires	that	we	be	causa	sui.35																																																										32	GS	299	and	GS	335.			33	Richardson,	“Nietzsche’s	Freedoms,”	129.		For	an	influential	account	of	Nietzsche’s	view	as	focused	on	self-creation,	see	Nehamas’	Nietzsche,	Life	as	Literature.	34	BGE	15	and	BGE	21.	35	I	expand	on	this	point	in	my	“Nietzsche’s	Existentialist	Freedom.”	
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Furthermore,	whatever	Nietzsche	means	by	self-creation,	it	cannot	involve	the	notion	of	a	Cartesian	soul	or	a	metaphysical	subject.		Nietzsche	is	critical	of	such	a	notion	in	
Genealogy,	for	example,	when	he	says	that	“the	subject	(or,	to	speak	more	popularly,	the	
soul)	has	until	now	been	the	best	article	of	faith	on	earth.”36				Notice,	however,	that	what	I	take	to	be	the	paradigmatic	self-constitution	accounts	also	reject	such	metaphysical	notions.		Schechtman	accepts	from	Locke,	and	other	psychological	continuity	theorists	like	Parfit,	that	the	notion	of	an	immaterial	soul	does	not	meaningfully	contribute	to	the	question	of	personal	identity.		In	even	stronger	terms,	she	takes	the	notion	“to	be	discredited”	and	does	not	engage	in	detailed	discussion	of	it.37		Korsgaard	makes	clear	that	she	is	not	even	considering	the	view	of	the	self	as	a	soul	that	is	outside	of	nature;	instead,	she	is	focused	on	providing	a	viable	alternative	to	Parfit’s	empiricist	and	reductionist	view.38		Korsgaard	and	Schechtman’s	rejection	of	the	notion	of	a	Cartesian	soul	while	providing	for	a	notion	of	unified	self	fits	well	with	the	following	account	by	Mark	Migotti	of	one	of	Nietzsche’s	central	concerns:	“Precisely	because	we	are																																																									36	GM	I	13.	37	See	for	example:	“Locke	uses	a	number	of	cases	to	show	that	sameness	of	body	and/or	immaterial	soul	(the	soul	being	constructed	as	featureless	immaterial	substance)	is	irrelevant	to	the	continued	existence	of	the	same	person…”	(Schechtman,	16)		See	also:	“Historically	there	is	a	third	option	–	the	view	that	personal	identity	over	time	consists	in	the	continuation	of	the	same	immaterial	soul.		I	do	not	discuss	this	possibility	in	much	detail	because	it	is	widely	believed	to	have	been	discredited	and	is	not	a	major	part	of	the	current	discussion.”		(Schechtman,	13fn14)		38	See	for	example,	the	following	passages	where	the	subject	of	experience	and	the	Cartesian	Ego	stand	for	the	kind	of	soul	that	Nietzsche	is	critical	of:	“Suppose	Parfit	has	established	that	there	is	no	deep	sense	in	which	I	am	identical	to	the	subject	of	experiences	who	will	occupy	my	body	in	the	future.		In	this	section	I	will	argue	that	I	nevertheless	have	reasons	for	regarding	myself	as	the	same	rational	agent	as	the	one	who	will	occupy	my	body	in	the	future.”	(Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency,”	109)		And	also,	“This	problem	should	seem	especially	pressing	if	Parfit	has	convinced	you	that	you	are	not	unified	by	a	Cartesian	Ego	which	provides	a	common	subject	for	all	your	experiences.”		(Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency,”	109)			
	 13	
not,	any	of	us,	metaphysically	simple,	divinely	sustained	substantial	souls,	the	task	of	becoming	a	self-unifying,	truly	individual	subject	becomes	urgent	for	some	of	us	–	indeed	precisely	those	for	whom	Nietzsche	writes	his	books.”39		The	idea	that	without	the	metaphysical	unity	given	by	an	immaterial	soul,	we	have	disparate	phenomena	is	a	key	component	of	(Active)	and,	as	explained	in	the	previous	section,	it	is	central	to	Korsgaard’s	view	that	ultimately	sees	the	unification	of	the	self	as	provided	by	practical	reason.40		 As	we	can	see	from	the	discussion	above,	there	is	good	evidence	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	endorsing	(Active.)		Furthermore,	though	Nietzsche	makes	some	remarks	that	could	be	taken	to	be	at	odds	with	the	self-constitution	view,	these	remarks	ultimately	support	the	self-constitution	view	and	are	reminiscent	of	similar	remarks	by	self-constitution	theorists.		The	self-constitution	view	seems	especially	well	positioned	to	make	sense	of	Nietzsche’s	emphasis	on	self-creation	while	criticizing	the	notion	of	a	metaphysical	soul.				III.	The	First	Person,	Practical	Point	of	View	
																																																								39	Migotti,	522.	40	Migotti’s	account	of	Nietzsche’s	view	as	focused	on	commitments	is	reminiscent	of	Korsgaard’s	view	and	provides	further	support	for	attributing	(Active)	to	Nietzsche.		See	for	example	the	following	passage:	“The	reason	Nietzsche	can	and	does	admire	the	ability	to	stand	securely	for	oneself	as	future	is	that	its	emergence	signals	the	presence	of	people	who	become	something	other	than	the	‘merely	passive	conduits	for	various	disparate	forces	already	existing	and	operating	around	them.’”	(Migotti	522,	Migotti	is	quoting	Gemes	2006:322)		The	notion	that	the	self	is	more	than	“merely	passive	conduits	of	various	disparate	forces”	is	very	close	to	Korsgaard’s	claim	that	the	role	of	the	principles	of	practical	reason	“is	to	impose	unity	on	what	would	otherwise	be	disparate	phenomena.”	(Korsgaard,	Sources	of	Normativity,	229.)		
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The	discussion	in	the	previous	section	was	focused	on	(Active).		As	we	saw	earlier,	the	self-constitution	view	also	includes	an	emphasis	on	the	practical	and	first	person	points	of	views.		In	what	follows,	I	argue	that	understanding	Nietzsche	as	endorsing	
(Practical)	and	(First	Person)	would	allow	us	to	make	better	sense	of	his	overall	view.		 First,	I’ll	start	with	a	clarification	regarding	these	two	points	of	view.		The	practical	and	the	first	person	points	of	view	may	come	together,	as	they	do	in	the	self-constitution	view,	but	they	need	not.		The	first	person	point	of	view	may	be	practical	or	theoretical.		From	the	first	person	perspective,	I	may	have	experiences	that	other	perspectives	cannot	adequately	capture—I	may	become	aware	of	features	of	reality,	unconnected	to	how	I	should	act,	that	other	perspectives	miss.41			The	practical	point	of	view,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	focused	on	what	I	should	do,	often	goes	along	with	the	first	person	point	of	view.		Indeed	one	may	think	that	the	practical	point	of	view	is	always	first	personal	as	it	involves	deliberating	about	what	to	do.		However,	one	may	think	about	what	others	should	do	or	how	to	reconcile	various,	perhaps	opposing,	first-person	practical	perspectives.		Insofar	as	those	questions	make	sense	and	they	are	practical,	we	would	have	examples	of	non-first	personal	practical	points	of	view.		Nagel,	for	example,	sees	the	possibility	of	ethics	as	depending	on	a	non-first	personal	practical	point	of	view:	“The	subject	matter	of	ethics	is	how	to	engage	in	practical	reasoning	and	the	justification	of	action	once	we	expand	our	consciousness	by	
																																																								41	See,	Nagel,	“What	is	like	to	be	a	bat?”,	Jackson,	“Epiphenomenal	Qualia,”	and	Searle,	“Minds,	Brains	and	Programs”	for	examples	of	non-practical	features	of	the	mind	(consciousness,	intentionality)	that	are	available	only	from	the	first	person	perspective	and	would	be	missed	from	a	purely	third	person	perspective.	
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occupying	the	objective	standpoint”42	In	the	self-constitution	view,	(Practical)	and	(First	
Person)	come	together	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	are	two	independent	claims	which	could	come	apart.43	Having	clarified	what	the	practical	and	first	person	points	of	view	entail,	in	what	remains	of	this	section,	I	will	focus	on	a	possible	objection	to	the	argument	I	am	presenting	in	this	paper.		The	objection	that	I	will	be	considering	is	that	Nietzsche,	contrary	to	Kant	and	Korsgaard,	takes	the	third	person	scientific	point	of	view	to	be	central.		If	this	is	correct	and	Nietzsche	did	emphasize	the	third	person	scientific	point	of	view	over	the	practical,	then	that	would	be	a	reason	against	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	providing	a	self-constitution	view.		My	argument	here	is	that	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	focused	on	emphasizing	the	third	person,	scientific	point	of	view,	leaves	out	a	central	aspects	of	Nietzsche’s	thought	and	ultimately	is	unsupported	by	the	texts.		 In	order	to	make	my	position	clearer,	it	is	worth	going	through	an	argument	against	the	interpretation	that	I	am	providing	here	in	some	detail	and	explaining	why	I	think	it	does	not	work.		My	discussion	in	the	remaining	of	this	section	will	be	focused	on	responding	to	the	argument	presented	by	Matthias	Risse	in	“Nietzschean	‘Animal	Psychology’	versus	Kantian	Ethics.”		Contrary	to	my	argument	here,	Risse	contrasts	Nietzsche’s	view	with	Kantian	views	like	Korsgaard’s	and	Nagel’s	and	ultimately	argues																																																									42	Nagel,	The	View	from	Nowhere,	139.		See	also:	“The	most	basic	idea	of	practical	objectivity	is	arrived	at	by	a	practical	analogue	of	the	rejection	of	solipsism	in	the	theoretical	domain.		Realism	about	the	facts	leads	us	to	seek	a	detached	point	of	view	from	which	reality	can	be	discerned	and	appearance	corrected,	and	realism	about	values	leads	us	to	seek	a	detached	point	of	view	from	which	it	will	be	possible	to	correct	inclination	and	to	discern	what	we	really	should	do.		Practical	objectivity	means	that	practical	reason	can	be	understood	and	even	engaged	in	by	the	objective	self.”	(Nagel,	The	
View	from	Nowhere,	140)	43	Thanks	to	the	editor	of	this	volume,	Paul	Katsafanas,	for	pressing	me	to	be	clearer	on	this	issue.	
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that	Nietzsche	emphasizes	the	third	person	point	of	view,	by	which	he	means	the	point	of	view	of	science.44		On	Risse’s	view,	Nietzsche	is	urging	us	to	focus	on	the	sciences,	and	see	ourselves	only	from	the	external,	third	person,	point	of	view	that	is	characteristic	of	the	sciences.		Furthermore,	Risse	takes	Nietzsche	to	be	pointing	out	that	the	third-person	point	of	view	shows	that	first	personal	deliberation	is	based	on	illusory	considerations	thus	flawed	in	crucial	respects.45		Risse	believes	that	we	can	develop	from	Nietzsche’s	works	a	critique	of	Kantian	views,	like	Nagel’s	and	Korsgaard’s,	that	fail	to	take	the	third-person	point	of	view	as	primary.		As	I	explain	below,	unlike	Risse,	I	believe	that	on	this	point	Nietzsche’s	view	is	more	similar	to	the	Kantian	views	not	critical	of	them.				In	some	ways,	it	seems	surprising	that	Nietzsche	would	be	arguing	that	we	need	to	be	less	personal	and	focus	more	on	the	impersonal	point	of	view.		Nietzsche,	after	all	says	that	every	great	philosophy	has	been	“the	personal	confession	of	its	author.”46	Risse	assumes	that	in	emphasizing	the	point	of	view	of	science,	Nietzsche	is	thereby	rejecting	the	first	person	practical	perspective	that	is	emphasized	by	Kantian	ethics.		Notice	however,	that	while	one	may	agree	with	Risse’s	point	that	Nietzsche	rejects	Kantian	ethics,	I	don’t	believe	that	Nietzsche	does	so	by	rejecting	the	first	person	practical	point	of																																																									44	See	for	example:	“Steven	Pinker,	discussing	the	soul,	writes	that	‘science	is	showing	that	what	we	call	the	soul	–	the	locus	of	sentience,	reason,	and	will	–	consists	of	the	information	processing	activity	of	the	brain,	an	organ	governed	by	the	laws	of	biology’	(2002:224).		It	is	that	thought	that	Nietzsche	tried	to	grasp,	working	with	what	biology	he	had	access	to.”	(Risse,	66.)	45	See	for	example:	“Nagel	believes	we	are	unable	to	see	ourselves	merely	as	portions	of	the	world.		But	accepting	this	external	point	of	view	to	the	exclusion	of	the	internal	one	is	precisely	Nietzsche’s	doctrine:	in	its	light	Nagel	emerges	as	another	theorist	insisting	on	an	untenable	‘juxtaposition	of	“man	and	world”’.”	(Risse,	73,	emphasis	added)		Notice,	however,	that	on	Nagel’s	view,	the	juxtaposition	is	between	two	perspectives	that	humans	can	take,	so	it	is	not	a	juxtaposition	between	humans	and	world,	rather	between	two	aspects	of	humanity.	46	BGE	6.	
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view.		Indeed	I	take	the	first	person	point	of	view	to	be	central	to	Nietzsche’s	practical	project	and	to	his	views	about	the	self.		On	Risse’s	view,	Nietzsche	would	seem	to	be	a	scientist,	attempting	to	find	out	how	the	mind	works.		I	don’t	disagree	that	Nietzsche	is	engaged	in	such	a	project.		But	as	I	argue	below,	I	don’t	think	that	this	captures	all	of	Nietzsche’s	interests	related	to	the	self,	there	is	good	reason	to	think	that	Nietzsche	is	interested	in	the	self	from	the	first	person	practical	point	of	view.			Risse	supports	his	interpretation	partially	by	invoking	Nietzsche’s	interest	in	psychology,	which	he	constructs	as	an	interest	in	third	person	explanations.		But	Nietzsche’s	interest	in	psychology	need	not	be	constructed	as	entirely	or	primarily	an	interest	in	third	person	explanations.	John	Richardson,	for	example,	explains	Nietzsche’s	interest	in	psychology	in	a	way	that	fits	well	with	an	interest	in	the	first	personal	perspective.		According	to	Richardson,	psychology	looks	for	reasons	not	just	descriptions.47		On	Richardson’s	interpretation,	Nietzsche	believes	that	“to	do	psychology…		one	requires	first-personal	acquaintance	with	those	wills	oneself.”48		Furthermore,	he	claims	that	“the	new	psychology”,	not	as	it	was	practiced	in	Nietzsche’s	time	but	as	he	would	like	it	to	be,	“involves	a	kind	of	‘subjectivity’	at	odds	with	the	‘objectivity’	called	for	by	science	so	far.”49	So,	Nietzsche’s	interest	in	psychology	need	not	be	evidence	that	he	is	interested	in	the	third	person	point	of	view	and	perhaps	even	supports	the	view	defended	here	that	Nietzsche	emphasizes	the	first	person	perspective.		Furthermore,	Risse	takes	Nietzsche	to	be	presenting	a	third	person	standpoint	critique	that	would	apply	to	a	view	like	Korsgaard’s	because	it	shows	that	the	Kantian																																																									47	Richardson,	“Nietzsche’s	Psychology,”	315.	48	Richardson,	“Nietzsche’s	Psychology,”	318.	49	Richardson,	“Nietzsche’s	Psychology,”	318.		
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understanding	of	the	self	is	mistaken	and	consequently,	any	reasoning	from	the	first	person	point	of	view	will	yield	illusory	conclusions.50		However,	notice	that,	like	Nagel	or	Korsgaard,	one	could	believe	that	a	conflict	between	the	third	person	theoretical	standpoint	and	the	first	person	practical	standpoint	should	not	to	be	resolved	by	privileging	the	third	person	theoretical	standpoint	and	eliminating	the	first	person	practical	standpoint.51		On	a	view	like	Korsgaard’s,	dropping	the	first	person	practical	perspective	would	be	to	give	up	on	any	practical	reasoning.	Thus,	Risse’s	claim	that	from	a	third	person	theoretical	standpoint	(the	standpoint	of	science,	for	example),	references	to	reasons	may	seem	illusory,	as	all	that	can	be	seen	from	that	perspective	may	be	causes,	is	not	a	threat	to	the	view	but	a	central	feature	of	it.		Korsgaard’s	point	is	that	insofar	as	we	are	thinking	about	what	to	do,	we	adopt	the	first	person	practical	standpoint	not	the	third	person	theoretical	standpoint.		It	is	from	that	perspective	that	self-constitution	takes	place	and	the	notion	of	the	self	makes	any	sense.		From	the	third	person	theoretical	standpoint,	we	may	find	with	reductionists	like	Parfit,	that	there	isn’t	much	of	a	self.		If	Nietzsche	held	the	view	that	Risse	attributes	to	him,	he	would	have	to	believe	that	the	third	person	theoretical	point	of	view	is	the	only	point	of	view	worth	taking	seriously	and																																																									50	“…	according	to	Nietzsche’s	attack	on	the	Kantian	notion	of	the	will,	we	are	deceived	precisely	about	what	that	process	is,	and	thus	this	attack	does	affect	how	we	should	characterize	the	decision	making	process.		That	is,	agents	would	systematically	give	wrong	answers	to	questions	about	why	they	acted	the	way	they	did,	and	would	do	so	because	they	are	deceived	about	their	own	decision-making	process.		Exploring	that	decision	process	is	the	subject	of	third-person	inquiries,	which	is	why,	by	way	of	contrast	with	the	truth	of	determinism,	they	matter	to	the	practical	standpoint.”	(Risse,	66)	51	Risse’s	focus	is	to	provide	a	Nietzschean	critique	of	the	Kantian	view.		What	I	say	here	is	not	meant	to	undermine	all	of	that	critique	or	to	suggest	that	Nietzsche	is	not	presenting	it.		Indeed	I	believe	that	Nietzsche	is	providing	a	direct	response	to	Kant	in	various	places.		The	only	point	I	am	concerned	with	here	is	that	part	of	Risse’s	account	of	Nietzsche’s	critique	which	would	seem	to	be	in	tension	with	the	self-constitution	view	I	am	presenting	here.		
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that	given	a	conflict	between	it	and	the	other	points	of	view,	the	third	person	point	of	view	would	prevail.		I	don’t	believe	this	fits	with	Nietzsche’s	view.		Nietzsche	places	great	emphasis	on	the	practical	point	of	view,	which	warrants	attributing	(Practical)	to	him	and	ultimately,	interpreting	him	as	a	self-constitution	theorist.	In	attributing	(Practical)	to	Nietzsche,	I	am	aligning	myself	with	Gardner’s	interpretation	of	Nietzsche’s	view	as	indicating	a	tension	between	the	theoretical	and	the	practical	points	of	view:	“…Nietzsche	regards	the	claims	of	naturalism	as	too	strong	to	allow	theoretical	reason	to	be	bent	into	the	shape	that	practical	reason	needs	it	to	assume.”52		Unlike	Risse,	Gardner	does	not	believe	that	Nietzsche	resolves	the	tension	by	privileging	the	theoretical	point	of	view.53	Gardner	attributes	to	Nietzsche	the	separation	between	the	two	points	of	view	while	leaving	Nietzsche	with	the	impossibility	of	reconciling	the	two	points	of	view	–	reminiscent	perhaps	of	Nagel’s	view	in	The	View	from	
Nowhere.	Furthermore,	Gardner	notices	that	for	Nietzsche,	the	practical	perspective	requires	the	presupposition	of	a	self	thus	providing	further	support	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	holding	(Practical).	Perhaps	the	clearest	evidence	 for	Nietzsche’s	priority	of	 the	practical	perspective	comes	from	the	last	section	of	the	Genealogy.		There,	Nietzsche	refers	to	the	human	need	for	meaning	or	purpose	and	relates	this	need	to	religious	answers	that	end	up	satisfying	the	 need	 only	minimally.	 	 The	Genealogy	would	 end	 on	 a	 very	 different	 note	 if	 it	were	urging	 us	 to	 focus	 on	 science.	 	 Instead,	 it	 seems	 to	 take	 on	 a	 practical	 perspective	 by	mentioning	how	an	“interpretation	[of	suffering]…		brought	new	suffering	with	it”	while																																																									52	Gardner,	20.	53	See	for	example,	“…	the	naturalistic	model,	though	it	coheres	with	Nietzsche’s	denial	of	the	reality	of	the	I,	conflicts	with	his	practical	presupposition	of	the	self,	and	more	generally	frustrates	the	ambitions	of	Nietzsche’s	practical	thought…”	(Gardner,	21)	
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insinuating	 that	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 could	 satisfy	 the	 demand	 for	 meaning.54		This	problem	of	meaning	that	Nietzsche	is	concerned	with	is	not	a	problem	at	all	from	the	third	person	theoretical	point	of	view.		Indeed	Nietzsche	seems	to	be	finishing	a	book	that	often	emphasizes	the	theoretical	perspective	by	pointing	out	 that	 it	 is	unsatisfying	 from	the	 practical	 point	 of	 view.55	Unlike	 Risse	 who	 does	 not	 focus	 much	 on	 Nietzsche’s	practical	claims,	Gardner	argues	that	a	reductionist	view	like	Hume’s	or	Parfit’s,	without	a	conception	 of	 a	 unified	 self,	 is	 not	 open	 to	 someone	 with	 Nietzsche’s	 practical	commitments.	Though	Nietzsche	makes	many	 remarks	 that	point	 toward	a	 reductionist	view,	the	fact	that	Nietzsche	takes	the	need	for	meaning	seriously	in	the	last	section	of	the	Genealogy	(and	doesn’t	just	explain	it	away)	is	hard	to	make	sense	within	a	reductionist	view.56			As	we	have	seen	above,	some	of	Nietzsche’s	remarks	that	may	seem	to	contradict	the	self-constitution	view	are	not	really	in	contradiction	if	they	are	coming	from	the	perspective	of	third	person	theoretical	philosophy.		But	in	addition,	we	have	seen	that	Nietzsche	sometimes	emphasizes	the	first	person	practical	perspective	over	the	third																																																									54	GM	III:28.	55	On	this	point,	see:	“Nietzsche	concludes	the	Genealogy	with	the	affirmation	that	we	have	a	need	which	points	beyond	nature	and	which	renders	a	non-naturalistic	self	conception	inescapable	for	us;	there	is	therefore	within	the	Genealogy,	on	the	face	of	it,	a	transition	of	its	terms	of	explanation	from	the	naturalist	of	the	First	and	Second	essays	to	the	concluding	recognition	of	a	trans-natural	perspective	on	the	Third.”	(Gardner,	26)	56	Gardner	emphasizes	how	the	explanation	for	the	need	for	meaning	is	not	enough	to	make	sense	of	Nietzsche’s	view:	“If	Nietzsche	were	to	be	a	consistent	naturalist,	then	he	would	have	to	agree	that	the	need	for	Sinn	can	be	explained	as	some	kind	of	evolutionary	or	whatever	Nebenwirkung,	to	be	resolved	back	into	a	naturalized,	mechanistic,	hedonistic	psychology.	But	-	if	naturalization	of	the	need	for	Sinn	were	to	have	the	meaning	for	Nietzsche	that	it	has	for	the	consistent	naturalist	–	Nietzsche	would	then	have	to	take	Freud’s	line	that	the	need	for	Sinn	cannot	be	taken	with	philosophical	seriousness,	and	his	practical	philosophy	would	crumble.”	(Gardner,	28)		
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person	theoretical	perspective.		It	thus	makes	sense	to	interpret	Nietzsche	as	holding	
(First	Person)	and	(Practical).		IV.	Activity	in	Nietzsche		 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 a	 series	 of	 related	 questions	 that	may	 lead	 us	 to	reject	 interpreting	 Nietzsche	 along	 the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 Is	 the	 notion	 of	 self-creation	 or	 self-constitution	 contradictory?	 	 Does	 it	 emphasize	 conscious	 reasoning,	which	 Nietzsche	 often	 de-emphasizes?	 	 Does	 it	 require	 a	 free	 self	 of	 the	 kind	 that	Nietzsche	rejects?	In	what	follows,	I	will	discuss	some	ways	of	answering	these	questions	such	 that	 they	 do	 not	 present	 a	 problem	 for	 interpreting	Nietzsche	 as	 providing	 a	 self-constitution	view.		 One	 feature	 of	 the	 self-constitution	 view	 is	 (Active),	 that	 one	 be	 active	 in	constituting	the	self.		One	may	wonder	how	it	is	possible	to	be	active	if	one	is	not	already	there,	 that	 there	 is	 something	 contradictory	about	a	 self	 that	 is	 active	 in	 creating	 itself.		Korsgaard	 and	 Schechtman	 both	 embrace	 this	 notion	 that	 the	 self	 is	 actively	 created.		Korsgaard	says,	“what	it	is	to	be	a	person,	or	a	rational	agent,	is	just	to	be	engaged	in	the	
activity	of	constantly	making	yourself	into	a	person…”57		Korsgaard	directly	addresses	the	possibility	that	there	be	something	contradictory	or	circular	in	the	self-constitution	view	but	 she	 argues	 that	 “being	 a	 person,	 like	 being	 a	 living	 thing,	 is	 being	 engaged	 in	 an	activity	of	self-constitution.”58		She	argues	“that	in	the	relevant	sense	there	is	no	you	prior	to	your	choices	and	actions,	because	your	identity	is	in	a	quite	literal	way	constituted	by	
																																																								57	Korsgaard,	42,	emphasis	added.	58	Korsgaard,	42.	
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your	choices	and	actions.”59	For	Korsgaard,	 the	self	 is	constituted	through	action	so	that	as	we	act,	we	are	at	the	same	time	constituting	the	self.		It	is	key	to	her	view	that	the	self	be	active	 for	 there	to	be	action	at	all.	 	Though	there	 is	an	 interdependency	between	the	notions	 of	 action	 and	 having	 an	 agent,	 the	 view	 need	 not	 be	 circular.	 	 Activity	 is	 what	makes	us	into	agents	and	agents	are	those	engaged	in	certain	type	of	activity.		 Schechtman	also	believes	that	the	self	needs	to	be	active	in	self-constitution.			She	says	 that	 a	 self-constituting	 narrative	 “is	 not	 simply	 a	 static	 set	 of	 facts	 about	 him,	 but	rather	a	dynamic	set	of	organizing	principles,	a	basic	orientation	through	which,	with	or	without	 conscious	 awareness,	 an	 individual	 understands	 himself	 and	 his	 world.”	 60	Schechtman	emphasizes	that	the	self	be	active	in	creating	a	narrative,	even	though	not	all	aspects	 of	 this	 narrative	 need	 to	 be	 fully	 conscious.	 	 The	 self-constitution	 view	 is	compatible	with	a	view	of	the	mind,	like	Nietzsche’s,	that	emphasizes	mental	states	that	are	not	conscious.		Some	of	the	organizing	principles	and	narrative	may	be	unconscious.				 While	Korsgaard	and	Schechtman	may	have	differing	views	of	what	it	means	to	be	active	 in	self-constitution,	 I	believe	this	notion	could	be	 filled	out	 in	a	way	that	 fits	well	with	 Nietzsche’s	 views.	 	 Just	 to	 point	 to	 an	 example,	 in	 Agency	 and	 the	 Foundations	 of	
Ethics,	 Katsafanas	 provides	 a	Nietzschean	 account	 of	 activity.	 	 For	my	purposes	 here,	 I	want	to	note	that	Katsafanas’	account	provides	an	example	of	what	an	account	of	activity	could	 look	 like	 such	 that	 it:	 (i)	 fits	 with	 Nietzsche’s	 views,	 (ii)	 fits	 with	 the	 self-constitution	account,	(iii)	is	not	circular	or	contradictory.			
																																																								59	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	19.	60	Schechtman,	116.	
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Katsafanas’	 account	of	 activity	 is	broadly	 compatibilist	 and	“does	not	 rely	on	 the	discredited	 claims	about	agency.”61		On	Katsafanas’	 account,	whether	 the	agent	 is	 active	depends	on	whether	the	agent	approves	of	her	action	and	whether	this	approval	would	be	undermined	with	more	knowledge	of	the	motivation	behind	the	action.		He	says,	“an	agent	is	active	iff	two	conditions	are	met:	(i)	the	agent	approves	of	her	action,	and	(ii)	further	knowledge	of	the	motives	figuring	in	the	etiology	of	this	action	would	not	undermine	her	approval	of	the	action.”62		This	account	coheres	well	with	Nietzsche’s	claims	that	the	true	motives	behind	our	actions	are	often	unknown,	as	it	does	not	require	that	the	agent	know	the	motives	behind	her	 actions	 for	 her	 to	 be	 active.	 Katsafanas	 points	 out	 that	 “we	 are	 examining	 a	counterfactual	–	in	which	the	agent	has	more	information	about	the	etiology	of	his	action	–	and	asking	whether	the	agent’s	approval	of	the	action	then	dissipates.”63			Though	one	may	think	that	 the	self-constitution	view	requires	transparency,	 that	one	 knows	 everything	 about	 the	 self,	 this	 account	 can	 allow	 for	 activity	 without	 such	transparency.	 	Schechtman	directly	addresses	the	issue	of	transparency	in	connection	to	her	 self-constitution	account	and	denies	 that	 transparency	 is	needed.	 	On	Schechtman’s	view,	the	self-constituting	narrative	need	not	be	articulated	or	explicit	(one	need	not	walk	around	telling	oneself	 the	story	of	one’s	 life)	nor	need	 it	be	 fully	conscious.64		Similarly,																																																									61	Katsafanas,	143	62	Katsafanas,	111.	63	Katsafanas,	142.	64	On	this	point,	see	for	example:	“I	call	a	person’s	underlying	psychological	organization	a	self-narrative	because	it	is	not	simply	a	static	set	of	facts	about	him,	but	rather	a	dynamic	set	of	organizing	principles,	a	basic	orientation	through	which,	with	or	without	conscious	awareness,	an	individual	understands	himself	and	his	world.		These	implicit	organizing	principles	are	not	simply	a	collection	of	features,	but	a	continually	developing	interpretation	of	the	course	of	one’s	trajectory	through	the	world.		In	this	way	it	is	
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attributing	to	Nietzsche	a	self-constitution	account	would	not	require	that	we	attribute	to	him	 a	 view	 of	 the	 mind	 as	 fully	 transparent.	 Indeed,	 the	 self-constitution	 view	 is	compatible	with	Nietzsche’s	views	that	we	are	often	ignorant	of	our	own	minds.65			As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 section,	 we	 can	 respond	 to	 various	 objections	 to	interpreting	 Nietzsche	 along	 the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 The	 view	 need	 not	 be	contradictory	and	 it	need	not	 require	a	picture	of	 the	mind	as	 transparent	or	a	view	of	freedom	that	is	incompatible	with	Nietzsche’s	rejection	of	metaphysical	free	will.		Some	of	these	questions	may	seem	to	present	a	problem	for	attributing	to	Nietzsche	a	version	of	the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 But	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 we	 may	 be	 able	 to	 answer	 these	questions	in	ways	that	are	compatible	with	Nietzsche’s	claims.		Conclusion	There	 are	 many	 advantages	 to	 interpreting	 Nietzsche’s	 as	 holding	 a	 type	 of	 self-constitution	account.		It	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	many	claims	by	Nietzsche	that	would	otherwise	 seem	 contradictory.	 	 This	 kind	 of	 interpretation	 coheres	 with	 many	 of	 his	remarks	about	self-creation	and	can	make	sense	of	his	practical	philosophy.		In	addition,	the	many	naturalistic	and	anti-metaphysical	remarks	made	by	Nietzsche	fit	well	with	this	kind	of	view	and	are	not	really	 in	opposition	with	 it,	 as	 long	as	 they	are	understood	as	theoretical	 claims	 that	do	not	undermine	 the	 importance	of	 the	practical	point	of	 view.																																																																																																																																																																																		legitimate	to	think	of	what	I	am	calling	the	implicit	self-narrative	as	a	self-conception,	even	though	it	contains	elements	that	the	person	explicitly	denies.”	(Schechtman,	116)	65	For	an	example	of	Nietzsche’s	emphasis	on	the	unconscious,	see:	“We	could	think,	feel,	will,	remember,	and	also	‘act’	in	every	sense	of	the	term,	and	yet	none	of	this	would	have	to	‘enter	our	consciousness’	(as	one	says	figuratively).		All	of	life	would	be	possible		without,	as	it	were,	seeing	itself	in	a	mirror;	and	still	today,	the	predominant	part	of	our	lives	actually	unfolds	without	this	mirroring—of	course	including	our	thinking,	willing,	and	feeling	lives...”	(GS	354)	
	 25	
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